

June 29, 1971

Dodd an increasingly lonely figure in a Senate dominated by those who sought not either defense or dignity, but simply followed the public opinion polls which indicated restlessness with a lingering war and an urge for a new isolationism. Those who fight the times do not always have an easy end. Would Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson, many ask, have launched an attack upon William Fulbright or George McGovern? The answer, these critics state, can easily be seen. In this sense, Senator Dodd paid not only for the data on his tax returns but for his steadfast opinions, which did not follow the tide of the times.

This writer had the opportunity to be associated with Senator Dodd for several years. When making a pronouncement about matters of foreign policy and defense he never consulted the polls, and he never took a count of the letters for and the letters against. His concern was what policy would best advance freedom, what policy would convince world Communism that aggression would not be permitted to succeed, what policy would best maintain the security of our own country. He supported the war in Vietnam, he opposed east-west trade, he defended our commitment to the Nationalist Chinese—not because it was popular, but because it was right. How many men who voted to censure Thomas Dodd can say that they base their votes on principle and not on convenience? Unfortunately, we will never know.

They told Senator Dodd that the Communists were no longer a danger, and that we needed to "reorder priorities." Despite the fact that he was long a domestic liberal, in favor of labor unions and gun control and civil rights, he recognized that without a firm posture in the world all of the domestic "priorities" mattered little. And when they told him he was not modern and was "behind the times," it seems that he simply wondered what they meant.

In his book, *The Fish Can Sing*, the Icelandic writer Halldor Laxness confronts one of his characters with a young man who believes in neither ghost stories nor any things unseen. In response, he states: "Mankind's spiritual values have all been created from a belief in all the things the philosophers reject. . . . How are you going to live if you reject not only the Barber of Seville but also the cultural value of ghost stories. If it were to be proved scientifically or historically or even judicially that the Resurrection is not, particularly well authenticated by evidence—are you then going to reject the B-minor Mass? Do you want to close St. Peter's Cathedral because it has come to light that it is the symbol of a mistaken philosophy and would be more useful as a stable? What a catastrophe that Giotto and Fra Angelico should have become enmeshed in a false ideology as painters, instead of adhering to realism. The story of the Virgin Mary is obviously just another falsehood invented by knaves and any man is a fraud who allows himself to sigh, 'Pietra Signor.'"

Somehow, Senator Dodd believed all of the old American ideas about individual freedom and human dignity and the need to oppose tyranny and oppression. What kind of "liberals" are they, he wondered, who could overlook Red China's rape of Tibet, the Soviet Union's persecution of Jews, the deprivation of freedom to millions of men, women, and children in Eastern Europe? If in order to be elected to public office you must leave your conscience on the doorstep maybe, he may have thought, it just isn't worth it.

Too many Members of Congress, and of the press corps, have become mere faddists. Senator Dodd would have agreed with C. S. Lewis when he said "We must condemn . . . the uncritical acceptance of the intellectual climate common to our own age and the assumption that whatever has gone out of date is on that account discredited. You must find out why it went out of date. Was it ever

refuted? And if so by whom, where, and how conclusively? Or did it merely die away as fashions do? If the latter, this tells us nothing about its truth or falsehood. From seeing this, one passes to the realization that our own age is also a 'period' and certainly has like all periods, its own characteristic illusions."

And so, a life is ended. But it was a life which, in the important things, was true to a standard far different from that of the roar of the crowd. Thomas Dodd saw the evils of Nazism and Communist first-hand. He recoiled from their horror only to find in his own country a growing unwillingness to confront evil.

Some will only remember of this man that he was censured by the Senate for income tax irregularities. But that may be the least important thing of all, and we ourselves may have fallen to such a depth that we can no longer recognize the heroic qualities in others. Thomas Dodd fought a lonely battle for the things upon which Western civilization is based and we must hope that in the next generation there will be enough of those to fight this same battle so that civilization itself will be preserved.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I am honored to have known and worked with Tom in this body. His disdain for partisan politics and his willingness to give me counsel were always appreciated. It is Tom Dodd's legacy and his work be continued, that we always fight for freedom; for, in the final analysis, our freedom is the only compelling reason that we continue. Without freedom in this country and in the world, life itself becomes meaningless and even mere existence nearly pointless. I turn to the words of President Nixon to emphasize what the loss of Tom Dodd means to our Nation:

He will be deeply missed and warmly remembered by all who cherish our priceless heritage of freedom, and for whom his life's achievements will remain an inspiration and a source of strength.

May we always keep his commitment to freedom, for then we shall always persevere.

THE PENTAGON PAPERS

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, on June 15—3 days after the New York Times began publishing a series of articles from a secret study of American participation in the Vietnam war—I asserted in the Senate that I found "little of a surprising nature."

I deplored the stealing of the documents and called for the prosecution of the person or persons who stole the top secret report. I also expressed wonder why material which covers a period that ended 3 years ago—and thus in a sense a history of the early days of the war—should be continued to be labeled top secret.

Yesterday, Sunday, June 27, the Associated Press distributed to its member newspapers a news story which documented that through the years the press told much of the Vietnam story, including matters now mistakenly thought to have been revealed to the American people for the first time in the Pentagon Papers.

The article was written by Peter Arnett an Associated Press newsmen who covered the war in Vietnam from 1962 through 1970. In the article he

analyzes the significant points in the disclosure of the secret study of the war.

I ask unanimous consent that the Associated Press article by Peter Arnett captioned, "The Pentagon Papers—Opening Government to the Public," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE PENTAGON PAPERS—OPENING GOVERNMENT TO THE PUBLIC

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following story* is by an Associated Press newsmen who covered the war in Vietnam from 1962 to 1970. In it he analyzes the significant points in the disclosures of secret government studies of the war.

(By Peter Arnett)

What is a citizen to make of the Pentagon Papers, the startling and historic documents whose publication has brought the press and the government into an extraordinary confrontation?

They lift the curtain on the view from inside a government struggling with a war rapidly bulging out of shape, a war never as close to solution as many official public statements made it out to be.

Many interpretations have already been placed on the disclosures from the 47-volume Pentagon study. But an understanding of the war years covered in the disclosures so far requires an examination not just of the secret documents but also of public official statements and press reports and public debate during the period.

A careful study of these elements leads to the following conclusions:

1—That discrepancies between some public statements of national leaders and their private assessments varied from evasions all the way to untruths.

2—That through leaks and reporters' observations in Vietnam, the press told much of the story, including matters now mistakenly thought to have been revealed to the American public for the first time in the Pentagon Papers.

3—That a pattern emerged to the unfolding events as America took fateful steps into the deeper commitment to war. The pattern showed first, decisions taken in secret. Then there followed the manifestations of these decisions in press reports from the field. Then, public controversy in the press and Congress usually followed, and finally came official confirmation of what was happening—sometimes candid, sometimes grudging and sometimes not entirely truthful.

These patterns are clear in an analysis of several major steps in the escalation of the war; for instance, in the decision to bomb North Vietnam and to commit massive numbers of U.S. ground troops to combat. It can be seen, too, in the Gulf of Tonkin incident which is explored fully for the first time in the Pentagon papers.

The real official facts of the crucial Tonkin Gulf incident—that the United States might well have provoked the North Vietnamese into attacking two American destroyers in 1964—remained hidden until the war study surfaced two weeks ago.

Press reports in these early war years revealed several major steps when there was official silence or even official denial.

Much of the controversy surrounding the Pentagon Papers deals with the period of the 1964 Presidential elections and suggestions from the Pentagon analysts that the administration was hiding options and decisions on war escalation from the American public.

However, news reports throughout the year dealt with the burgeoning war. For example: The Associated Press disclosed in January 1964 that U.S. officials in Saigon were weigh-

ing the possibility of asking for American combat troops.

In March of that year, American pilots were shown to be engaged in direct combat in Vietnam. In June, Washington reports had the Johnson administration weighing the possibility of bombing North Vietnam.

In January 1965, the clandestine American air operations in Laos were disclosed by reporters. And in April, despite President Johnson's known desire to avoid "premature publicity" on his order to enlarge the combat role of Marines just sent to Vietnam, the press followed the troops into battle and told what they were doing.

Congress responded.

"The people have a right to know where we are going and what we are doing," declared Sen. Kenneth Keating, R-N.Y., in demanding a full congressional inquiry and review of the war and the U.S. role in it in March 1964.

Republican congressional leaders in April called on President Johnson to end the "fiction" that Americans were not actively fighting in Vietnam.

In May, Sen. Ernest Gruening, D-Alaska, urged an investigation to determine whether facts on the South Vietnam situation had been withheld "not for security reasons but to cover up bureaucratic bungling."

The Pentagon analysts, a team of hand-picked experts who began their work on the war documents in 1967, do not treat in detail that public record on Vietnam, particularly in the important years of escalation in 1964 and 1965—the only period fully documented publicly so far. The analysts also lacked Johnson's own White House papers on the war.

Their approach has tended to ignore some facts generally known at the time. For example, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in a news conference in Washington on March 26, 1964, said that one of the Vietnam options then before President Johnson was the initiation of military actions outside South Vietnam, particularly against North Vietnam.

The secretary added, "This course of action—its implications and ways of carrying it out—has been carefully studied."

Yet the documentary confirmation that such alternatives were even considered caused a public stir when the Pentagon Papers first came out two weeks ago in *The New York Times*.

There were some aspects of the war in which the Johnson administration never did come to terms with press and critics. There's a thread of black pessimism running through many of the key Pentagon documents while at the same time officials voiced a relentless optimism in their public statements.

The 7,000 pages of the Pentagon Papers will no doubt occupy historians for years. But for the purposes of this analysis the secret decisions and proposals revealed in the papers are weighed against official statements and press reporting of the period in three years: the Tonkin Gulf incident, the air war against North Vietnam, and the commitment of American combat troops to the war.

THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH

The secret history of the bombing war disclosed in the Pentagon Papers shows the Joint Chiefs of Staff making the first recommendation—in January, 1964. They suggested that the South Vietnamese assume open responsibility for the American backed air attacks.

The history further reveals that Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor proposed in a cable from Saigon in August that year that "something be added to the war effort" to win. That "something" he proposed was "a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on North Vietnam with January 1, 1965, the target date."

A secret White House meeting on Sept. 7 reached a "general consensus," according to

the Pentagon Papers, on the necessity of air strikes early in 1965, and in December 1964 President Johnson approved the strike—tit-for-tat reprisal for 30 days and a graduated air war to follow. The bombing began in February 1965.

On the record, McNamara had mentioned possible action outside Vietnam in a press conference in March 1964. In June he reiterated to a Senate committee that to deter the enemy "it may require some military action outside the border."

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said July 20, 1964, "An extension of the war into the north is regarded by the United States as in the realm of contingency planning for the future." President Johnson said in August, and throughout the presidential elections, that he had turned down advice to bomb the North.

The press was hard on the scent of the bombing trail. A story out of Washington on June 24, 1964, said "The United States is speeding its planning for air strikes by South Vietnamese forces against Communist supply bases in Laos and North Vietnam..." The report added, "The possibility of such a move figures high in official thinking, it was learned tonight."

A June 27 report from Saigon reported that American jets were bombing in Laos and one had been shot down. The planes were apparently flying out of bases in Thailand, South Vietnam and on the 7th Fleet, the report said.

A Washington dispatch in July reported that two types of air attacks against North Vietnam were being considered, the first a tit-for-tat retaliation strike to follow Viet Cong guerrilla attacks in the South. There was an alternative strategy and it called for the planned destruction of military targets in North Vietnam "to try and change the policies of the aggressor," the report added. High officials were quoted as saying that no decision on expanding the war had been made although plans of action had been drawn up "and forces either have or will be put into position to carry out quickly any decisions."

The raids against the North eventually took the form as outlined in the Washington dispatch of July 1964.

The United States continued bombing in Laos, but as a news dispatch from Saigon commented mid-January 1965, "The U.S. government is still not ready to acknowledge that it has warplanes in combat outside the borders of South Vietnam." The whole air campaign in Laos was one of the best reported secrets of the war.

An administration view of the scheduling of air raids against North Vietnam with an eye on political considerations emerges from the Pentagon papers. The study said "tactical considerations" required a delay in the launching of the air strikes because "Johnson was presenting himself (in the presidential elections) as the candidate of reason and restraint."

For that reason, the study says, the air strikes were delayed until February the following year. In the 1964 elections, Johnson's adversary, Sen. Barry Goldwater, was cast as the advocate of unleashing air power against the North.

GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT

The events that led up to what were officially termed "barbaric, unprovoked attacks" by North Vietnamese PT boats on two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August, 1964, had been set in motion early that year by Johnson, the secret papers now reveal.

He ordered Operation Plan 34A which called for U2 flights over Laos, raids on North Vietnam by South Vietnamese and Nationalist Chinese commando teams, and naval bombardment along the North Vietnamese coastline. McNamara had recommended the plan, the documents attest, in hopes that the

steadily escalating pressure would force the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao guerrillas to halt their insurrections.

In these secret operations were American destroyers on intelligence patrols in the international waters of the Tonkin Gulf. The Pentagon analysts say the physical presence of the destroyers provided the elements for the Tonkin clash.

The destroyers Turner Joy and Maddox were hit twice in early August after clandestine South Vietnamese attacks against nearby Communist coastal installations. In the second attack, the secret study reveals, both destroyers were definitely warned that the attacks were going to take place.

Officially, President Johnson went on national television to decry the attacks and announced he had dispatched retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. He also demanded a resolution from Congress allowing him to "take all the necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to protect American interests. The result was the much debated Tonkin Gulf Resolution used to support the administration's right to expand the war as it thought necessary, without further Congressional action.

On the public record in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in August 1964 and February 1968, McNamara claimed that neither of the two American destroyers in the gulf had any knowledge of the clandestine attacks. Yet the Pentagon Papers said both destroyers were definitely warned about the clandestine South Vietnamese attacks. He also said that neither the Maddox nor the Turner Joy participated in these activities, a fact borne out by the Pentagon Papers.

Press comment was limited at the time because of the difficulty of reaching the attack scene in the Gulf. An Associated Press report quoted U.S. military men as being baffled by the Communist patrol boat raids on the U.S. ships.

Senator Wayne Morse, D-Ore., was the most vehement challenger of the American position. He charged that the Tonkin Gulf incidents "are as much the doing of the United States as they are of the North Vietnamese. We have been making covert war in Southeast Asia for some time... it was inevitable and inexorable that sooner or later we would have to engage in overt acts of war in pursuance of our policy, as we are doing now."

Morse declared prophetically "When the high emotionalism of the present crisis has passed, historians will disclose that for some time past there have been violations of North Vietnamese and Cambodian borders by South Vietnamese, and I am also satisfied that they will disclose that the United States was not an innocent bystander."

AMERICANS INTO LAND WAR

The Pentagon study revealed comparatively little about the series of decisions that put American combat troops into Vietnam, but two key recommendations were listed. The first was a memo to McNamara by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1964 suggesting that the United States "must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder actions in Southeast Asia." The memo suggested that U.S. forces might be committed "as necessary in direct action against North Vietnam."

On August 18 in a cable from Saigon, the papers reveal, Ambassador Taylor suggested that if air strikes were launched against the North then Army Hawk missiles and U.S. Marines be dispatched to Da Nang to protect the important air base.

Officially, there are few recorded public statements about combat troop commitments, but there are many speculative press reports, and the appointment of Gen. Taylor as ambassador in June 1964 was widely regarded around the world as evidence that the

United States intended to step up its military activity in Southeast Asia.

The day of Taylor's appointment, a news story from Saigon said, "America appears to be facing its closest approach to a general war in Asia since the closing of hostilities in Korea in 1953," and cited the hardening attitude of both sides. "A progressive show of force by both sides could explode at some point into a war," the news dispatch said.

Two battalions of U.S. Marines landed in Da Nang on March 8, 1965, and the secret Pentagon papers indicate that President Johnson ordered a new mission for them within the month. The mission "will permit their more active use . . . the actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practical but in ways that should minimize the appearance of sudden changes in policy," the papers say.

But even before Johnson widened the Marines' mission the press was reporting a much bolder combat stance from the field. "Privately many are confident that the expeditionary force will soon be strengthened and its assigned job enlarged to include an active role in the fighting against the Communist Viet Cong," said a news dispatch on March 20.

The obvious heating up of the American combat role did not ruffle the official stance. On April 1, 1965, the day the papers say he approved the critical change of mission of U.S. troops in Vietnam to that of combat instead of defense, Johnson told reporters, "I know of no far reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated."

On April 10, an Associated Press story from Da Nang said, "technically, all marines coming in are to defend Da Nang airbase, but defense is broadly interpreted in this base. The marines are patrolling and fighting many miles from Da Nang, even in the mountain passes between Da Nang and Hue to sweep Viet Cong from the area. They might even be used on Eagle Flight helicopter assaults."

On June 5, the State Department for the first time acknowledged that American troops in South Vietnam "engaged in combat" if attacked and fired upon.

In July President Johnson authorized the commitment of 200,000 Americans at the urgent insistence of the field commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland. Johnson ordered that his decision be kept secret.

But already on April 13, Sen. John Stennis in an Associated Press interview had set the scene for the immediate future. "The United States must be prepared to fight a stepped up war in Vietnam for an indefinite period," the Mississippi Democrat said. "America is certain to increase its participation in the war."

He predicted that more American troops would soon be committed to Vietnam.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR MATHIAS— ADDRESS BY SENATOR SCOTT

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, last night in Cumberland, Md., a group of grateful citizens gathered to pay their respects to my illustrious colleague in the Senate, the Honorable CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR. This "Mathias Appreciation Dinner," attracting an overflow audience of over 400 people, was given in recognition of Senator MATHIAS' 11 years of service, both as a Member of the House of Representatives and of the U.S. Senate for the people of western Maryland.

The principal speaker for this occasion was our distinguished minority leader, Senator HUGH SCOTT, of Pennsylvania, who delivered a very personal and genuine tribute to Senator MATHIAS. So that Senators may have the benefit of these most appropriate comments by our dis-

tinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Senator SCOTT's address be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR HUGH SCOTT OF PENNSYLVANIA, REPUBLICAN LEADER AT THE APPRECIATION DINNER FOR SENATOR CHARLES MAC MATHIAS, JUNE 28, 1971

Mac Mathias is one of the bulwarks of the U.S. Senate. He is an outstanding Republican and supporter of President Nixon.

He certainly is a prime mover in the Republican caucus to bring vigor and determination and new ideas to the Senate and shows strong sense of pride in supporting programs proposed by President Nixon.

He was the author of reforms in his own party which assured newer Senators of broader recognition, earlier than the old seniority system would have permitted.

He is a man of deep feeling and a deep conviction to serve his fellow man. He has been doing this . . . serving the public . . . since he joined the U.S. Navy as an enlisted man early in World War II.

Pennsylvania had something to do with his early development. He graduated from one of our fine colleges . . . in fact an outstanding Quaker college . . . Haverford, located in a neighboring community to where Mrs. Scott and I have a home.

Mac is one of 26 Members of the Senate who served in the Navy during the war. He holds a Reserve commission as a captain. In fact in our Republican caucus we can pipe aboard 13 men who stood at attention to "Anchors Aweigh."

We look at Mac affectionately as one of the young movers and shakers. He has been a mover, a changer of Senate routine, one who wants to break with tradition and the status quo and get quicker action by making the Senate more responsive. I, too, agree with this approach. Unfortunately we as the minority party can't do much about changing the pace of the Senate until we get the Democrat committee chairmen to move their work faster out of committees or until we move the Democrats out of their chairmanships.

There is an unchartered club of Republican Senators. It is known as the Wednesday Club and our younger Members like Mac and your other outstanding Senator, Glenn Beall, play important roles in shaping where we are going as Republicans. Speaking of Glenn, he is doing a great job since he moved into the Upper House. He is following in his father's footsteps, a man for whom I had great respect, for I served with him when he was a Member of the Senate and had an opportunity to work closely and learn from him.

How fortunate is Maryland! Two articulate, diligent, and highly effective young Senators. Be sure to appreciate them, to work to keep in the Senate two strong, able voices for Maryland.

For 13 years now, Mac has been serving you fine people of Maryland. I would think he looks back at his service as a former prosecutor the way I do . . . as the greatest opportunity to work for justice. His five years as a city attorney following two years as an assistant State attorney general gave him the necessary far-sightedness and compassion to become an elected official and a good one.

And, we all know the record of Mac Mathias since. He has been unbeatable. Since 1960 he has been winning, eight years in the Congress and now his first term in the Senate. He has stood tall in the type of legislative programs he represents and in his support of those legislative programs sent to the Senate by the President.

Take a look at the record. Mac has taken a strong stance on fighting crime. As a mem-

ber of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a one time prosecutor, he knows we must give the police more tools and stronger support to crack down on the criminal element.

He joined me in sponsoring the Clean Air Act amendments and also co-sponsored the Scott-Mathias election reform bill that should come to the floor of the Senate shortly.

Mac is behind the Nixon welfare reform bill. He has made his point very clear that we don't accomplish anything by just adding to the present system. We must kill the bureaucratic monster and start over again.

One thing about Republicans—we have the most innovative ideas. We are a party of ideas, but the Democrats then outbid us on money. Your money, your tax money. When we finally get a program it costs so much more because of the amount the Democrats add. They can do it. They can get away with it because they are the majority party in Washington.

A good example—the President's far-reaching education bill. The President asked for \$5.1 billion. The Senate added \$804 million over the \$4.8 billion the House asked for. So we have a conference between both Houses.

And I think a recent statement by Senator Mathias on his feeling for President Nixon's revenue sharing program best identifies him with this administration. He said "the Congress will shirk its responsibility to the American people if it does not send relief to local taxpayers by passing President Nixon's revenue sharing plan and plotting a course of financial relief for the Nation's colleges and universities."

These are the works of an outstanding man, an outstanding Republican and a man of great determination for serving his great State of Maryland.

For the Free State demands free men—free to carry the standards of good causes, free to lead, free to lend strength where strength is needed.

Such a man is Mac Mathias.

A TIME TO REAFFIRM AMERICA'S SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the 195th anniversary of America's independence is fast approaching. On the fourth July Americans and freedom-loving people the world over celebrate the signing of one of the world's foremost documents of human rights.

Yet another document of human rights has remained unacted upon by the Senate for more than 22 years. How can the Senate allow another Independence Day to pass with the Genocide Convention not ratified. How can the Senate justify this inaction?

Attorney General Mitchell has stated there are no constitutional drawbacks to ratification. President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers support ratification. The committees of the American Bar Association which studied the Convention most closely called for ratification.

At this time of remembrance and renewal the Senate should reconsider the principles upon which this Nation was founded. The Senate should reaffirm America's support of human rights by ratifying the Genocide Convention and the two other human rights conventions still before it.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO SCHOOLING

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, the Saturday Review of June 19, 1971, con-